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**STABILITY, SECURITY STRUCTURES,
AND U.S. POLICY FOR EAST ASIA
AND THE PACIFIC**

Thomas L. Wilborn

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Thomas L. Wilborn

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The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release; distribution unlimited.

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FOREWORD

Unlike Europe, where many regional political, economic, and security regional organizations are in place, very few regional structures, especially which relate to security, exist in East Asia and the Pacific. U.S. security relations in the region are primarily regulated by bilateral agreements which were initially developed to implement the policy of containment against the Soviet Union.

This study analyzes U.S. security policy in East Asia and the Pacific against the background of the post-cold war strategic environment in the region and the preoccupation with domestic economic problems at home. The author concludes that current security policy, while successful and generally well received in the region, would better serve U.S. objectives if it were executed through a complex of security structures; not only U.S. bilateral arrangements. While comprehensive organizations like NATO or CSCE may not be appropriate for East Asia and the Pacific, a variety of existing structures can be orchestrated to provide a security web which will promote U.S. objectives with limited direct participation.

This study meets an identified study requirement as established in SSI's annual research program, "The Army's Strategic Role in a New World Order: A Prioritized Research Program, 1992."

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this essay as a contribution to the on-going debate on U.S. strategy in Asia and the Pacific.



JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE
Colonel, U.S. Army
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

DR. THOMAS L. WILBORN, a National Security Affairs Analyst, is an Asian specialist with the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College. His recent publications include *Roles for the Army in a Peacetime Engagement Strategy for the Pacific*, and *How Northeast Asians View Their Security*, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1992 and 1991, respectively; and "Arms Control and R.O.K. Relations with the D.P.R.K.," *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, Winter 1990. He is also author or co-author of several other studies and articles related to Asian security, nuclear doctrine, and NATO. Before joining the Institute in 1975, Dr. Wilborn taught international relations and political science at James Madison University and Central Missouri University, and served on a University of Kentucky educational assistance group working at the Institut Teknologi Bandung, Bandung, Indonesia. He received the Ph.D degree in political science from the University of Kentucky.

SUMMARY

The purpose of this report is to suggest a modification to current U.S. policy on East Asia and Pacific (EAP) security—incorporating an explicit definition of stability and a new approach to regional security structure—which would foster continued achievement of national security objectives, but also meet major domestic criticisms, including costs, and concerns of observers from the region. As background to the discussion, the report first includes a description and analysis of current regional security policy, including the characteristics which have generally been applauded within the region as well as those which led to domestic criticism and expressions of doubts abroad. After the elements of the proposed approach are outlined, some analysis of the resulting policy is presented.

Post-cold war strategy in EAP, in addition to deterrence of North Korean attacks against the South, focuses primarily on maintaining regional stability, which seems threatened by the very nature of the post-cold war international system. The belief is widespread that the United States, for domestic economic reasons, will withdraw from EAP in the future, permitting dormant regional disputes to surface. Many are concerned that China and/or Japan will adopt assertive policies in the absence of a strong U.S. military presence.

There are two major problems with U.S. security policy in EAP: It is based on a concept of stability which is seen to equate with the status quo, and it is potentially expensive. Given the dynamism of EAP, the United States needs to explicitly assert a definition of stability which provides for peaceful change *as initiated within the region*. Moreover, it should operationalize this definition by supporting regional structures which have the potential to manage regional change while preserving stability in the region. The United States will not only not necessarily support the status quo or appear to be imposing *pax Americana* on the region, but it should also achieve its national security objectives at less cost.

This is not a recommendation for the United States to support the creation of a comprehensive regional security organization modeled on CSCE, or a multimember collective defense alliance modeled on NATO. For a number of reasons, neither are appropriate for EAP at this time, if they ever will be.

Instead, this proposal calls for the United States to recognize the existence of a variety of geographically and functionally limited security structures in EAP, and the potential for more to be formed. These structures, ranging from bilateral security cooperation agreements to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia Pacific Economic Conference (APEC), form a web of security structures which together provide an institutional base which, in time, may approach the mature organizations of Europe in facilitating change without crises, conflict, or the threat of conflict.

By adopting such a policy, the United States should not "withdraw" from EAP in any sense. In the first place, U.S. bilateral alliances and understandings are part of the security web. And uncertainty is likely to prevail in the region for some time, as the structures which make up that web develop and as the global security system evolves. None of the existing organizations are presently capable of dealing with major crises which might involve a major regional power—not unless the United States provides the leadership. Responses to regional crises on the model of DESERT SHIELD\STORM also may be required. They should be less frequently required—but easier to execute when necessary—the more developed and extensive the region's security web.

STABILITY, SECURITY STRUCTURES, AND U.S. POLICY FOR EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

Introduction.

The United States has entered the post-cold war era in East Asia and the Pacific (EAP)¹ with a security policy widely accepted by most governments in the region and also apparently successful in achieving the primary U.S. regional security objective, a relatively stable and tranquil region.² However, the policy's success and wide acceptance has not prevented increasingly frequent criticism within the United States,³ and its credibility has also been challenged within the region, often by observers who simultaneously praise it.⁴

The purpose of this report is to suggest a modification to current U.S. policy on EAP security—incorporating an explicit definition of stability and a new approach to regional multinational agencies—which would foster continued achievement of national security objectives in EAP, but also meet major domestic criticisms and concerns of observers from the region. As background to the discussion, the paper first includes a description and analysis of current regional security policy, including the characteristics which have generally been applauded within the region as well as those which led to domestic criticism and expressions of doubts abroad. After the elements of the proposed approach are outlined, some analysis of the resulting policy is presented.⁵

U.S. Security Policy in East Asia and the Pacific.

Post-cold war strategy in EAP, in addition to deterring North Korean attacks against the South, focuses on maintaining regional stability, encouraging the expansion of democracy and human rights, providing a suitable environment in which the United States may participate in the economic developments of the region, and insuring access to the

important decision centers of EAP.⁶ The deterrence and defense objectives in Korea are direct carryovers from the cold war era, and they are pursued via cold war strategic concepts like forward deployment and collective defense. The others, however, justified and rationalized as auxiliary or secondary goals which at least indirectly contributed to the success of containment during the cold war, have emerged as high priority security objectives in their own right in the last several years.⁷ They are imbedded in the security environment of post-cold war EAP, and the United States attempts to advance them through strategic concepts which, while traditionally within the strategic arsenals of major powers, have been redefined to be compatible with the evolving relationships of the region. These objectives are no longer overshadowed by survival and sovereignty objectives which dominated U.S. cold war security policy for the region.⁸ The latter are still present—every nation strives to protect its existence, sovereignty, and independence—but are not directly challenged or expected to be in the foreseeable future.

On the other hand, regional stability seems to be challenged by the very nature of the evolving international system, which implies decentralization and diffusion of power. Uncertainty seems to be replacing the more-or-less predictable patterns of behavior associated with the bipolar structure of the cold war. That uncertainty is not only derived from the disintegration of the Soviet Union, once the supporter, ally, and restrainer of North Korea and Vietnam, but more noticeably from the widely held perception that the United States, fatigued from carrying the burdens of world leadership and plagued by unfavorable economic conditions at home, also will disengage from EAP. And with the United States disengaging, many regional leaders foresee the reemergence of old antagonisms and a greatly enhanced probability of conflict. More specifically, many of the region's leaders fear a politically active Japan pursuing independent policies which will be increasingly enforced by an increasingly offensive military capability if the United States weakens its security relationship with that country.⁹ Other regional observers (and often the same observers) believe that an assertive China will seek to fill the "vacuum" which will appear as U.S. forces are

pulled back. Many leaders of the region, some of whom would never have done so during the cold war, now publicly declare that active U.S. engagement and a credible U.S. military and security presence are desirable for the preservation of stability and security in EAP.¹⁰ They also increasingly support greater military expenditures for their own nations in the uncertain conditions of the evolving world order.¹¹

To protect its own interests, the United States now pursues the very policy that the region's leaders desire continued: engagement and forward military presence. If forward military presence in the region provides assurance that the region will remain relatively stable, then providing that assurance satisfies the broad objectives of most governments in the region as well as those of the United States. As U.S. Government spokesmen frequently assert, military presence not only allows the United States to influence military balances and prevents resort to violence in some disputes, but, more importantly, it permits the United States to be an "honest broker,"¹² mediating among contestants to find acceptable solutions. Honest brokers will also be present to defend their own interests and gain intimate knowledge about regional developments which could influence their objectives in the future.

The Korean conflict is the most prominent and dangerous residue of East-West confrontation in the region, but it has obviously also been fundamentally transformed by the changes in the international system. The D.P.R.K. can no longer be the surrogate for the Soviet Union or Communist bloc, if only because neither the Union nor bloc any longer exists. On the other hand, Pyongyang is probably the most isolated regime in existence, with even the PRC having extended full diplomatic relations to Seoul. Its economy is also in disarray. If North Korea surpasses the South on any dimension, it is military capability, including intermediate range ballistic missiles and possibly nuclear warheads (not, of course, an insignificant factor in American policy). Trying to maintain military supremacy with a faltering economy and no superpower patron to supply modern military equipment, or even petroleum except at market prices, has been a heavy burden which may become intolerable in the future.¹³

On the other hand, the Republic of Korea (R.O.K.), once a client and now more a partner of the United States, not only surpasses the D.P.R.K. on every dimension except military capability (where it is gaining), but has also become a model for developing states. Its economic record for the 1980s is frequently called a miracle, it has established a working democratic political system, and it has demonstrated unusual diplomatic success. Moreover, Pyongyang and Seoul have begun regular high level contacts. While they have only led to limited concrete developments and are intermittently interrupted for short-term political purposes (usually by the North), they hold the promise of a solution to the division of the nation.¹⁴ U.S. policy reflects these changes in generally deferring and appearing to defer to Seoul (except perhaps on the nuclear question) as far as North-South relations are concerned, something the Leader of the Free World never did during the cold war. The United States is deemphasizing military confrontation by suspending Team Spirit exercises; marginally reducing U.S. military personnel;¹⁵ moving from a "leading to a supporting role" in the bilateral military relationship; and engaging in cautious dialogue with the North Korean regime.¹⁶

Problems in U.S. Regional Security Policy.

Notwithstanding its current success, there are two major interrelated problems with U.S. policy in EAP, one very practical—its costs—and one theoretical. The fundamental theoretical problem is U.S. policy's identification with stability, a term never clearly defined in policy statements but which normally, under current conditions, appears to mean the status quo.¹⁷ As a near-term expedient, supporting the status quo is probably justified throughout EAP, and defensible before the U.S. Congress, national security community, and electorate. For the longer term, however, commitment to the status quo is clearly unacceptable in principle, and is likely to be counterproductive in practice. EAP is a highly dynamic region. Most of its nations achieved independence in the post-war era, inheriting political institutions and external boundaries created by their former (and for all but a few, non-Asian) colonial rulers.

With the exception of Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, which are economically and politically "advanced" by most measures, EAP states also are moving, with different speeds and by different formulas, from relatively underdeveloped political and economic systems to relatively modern ones. It is inevitable that there will be demands for changes in subregional, regional, and international relationships and institutions, and many of these demands will probably be justified. Moreover, besides being potentially objectionable to regional nations, the status quo will not necessarily serve the national interests of the United States in the future.

U.S. policy, therefore, as it presents the longer term goals of the United States in the region and as it reacts to regional demands for alternatives to the status quo, must redefine its objective of stability to include orderly, desirable regional change. And it will not be sufficient merely for the United States to selectively intervene unilaterally or within the context of a bilateral relationship when a development appears to affect U.S. regional interests. That approach smacks too much of *Pax Americana*—the United States as regional policeman—for acceptance over the long term by the American Congress and electorate, not to mention EAP policymakers. Even forming ad hoc coalitions on the model of Operations DESERT SHIELD and STORM, while preferable to unilateral or bilateral military action and certainly appropriate in some circumstances, too much depends on the vagaries of U.S. politics to provide assurance of the sustained engagement of the United States. At any rate, ad hoc arrangements will normally, if not always, be organized to oppose aggression rather than support orderly change. Moreover, to give this new definition credibility, it should be operationalized through a set of mechanisms—participated in and/or supported, but not necessarily dominated, by the United States—for articulating and implementing proposals for alterations of the status quo.

The practical problem of U.S. security policy in EAP is related to the theoretical one. Absent a regional or global threat to American security interests narrowly defined,¹⁸ the U.S. Congress, reflecting attitudes of the electorate, is not likely to

provide for an indefinite regional military presence to maintain stability merely because the nations of the region desire it, even if the United States indirectly benefits also. Especially when there are massive economic problems at home, but probably even in times of relative prosperity, the expenditure of funds to maintain military bases in EAP will have to be justified by an understandable rationale which is clearly related to U.S. interests. The U.S. position must be one which conceptually anticipates a time when significant overseas deployments will no longer be required; i.e., in principle (even if the exact date cannot yet be determined or a very lengthy period appears to be involved). In other words, U.S. policy must be directed toward the long-term goal of creating conditions under which regional security objectives can be achieved without necessarily maintaining military bases or sustaining large numbers of permanently deployed forces on foreign soil within the region, especially if heavy expenditures are required.

Stability Incorporating Orderly Change.

Radical changes are not required to adjust U.S. policy to the realities of the security environment of the region and the exigencies of American politics. Part of the adjustment need only be in declaratory policy: The United States should explicitly commit itself to accept changes in East Asia and the Pacific which are initiated or supported within the region and which are not imposed by force. Stability in EAP as an objective of U.S. foreign policy should be defined not as the status quo and no longer (except for the Korean peninsula) as a predictable security relationship with a putative enemy, but explicitly as an environment in which leaders of the region consider their nations sufficiently secure so as to pursue legitimate national and international objectives without concern about external threats and without the need to divert excessive resources for weapons and other military purposes. Stability should also encompass conditions which encourage extraregional powers, including but not limited to the United States, to pursue legitimate objectives as long as they conform with accepted international procedures. These conditions,

goals which may never be perfectly achieved but which are nonetheless in the interests of the United States to strive for, are now approximated in Western Europe because of the complex institutions of the European Community, the Western European Union, NATO, and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). They are poorly approximated in EAP because regional institutions are relatively weak and fragmented. Attaining such stability in the region implies the development of either a comprehensive security organization or a broad array of limited arrangements which provide for adjusting disputes and brokering compromises, if not fostering consensus.

Organization for Security in East Asia and the Pacific.

A comprehensive security organization for East Asia modeled on CSCE, while recommended by such disparate authorities as Leonid Brezhnev and Gareth Evans,¹⁹ is considered premature, if not completely inapplicable, for East Asia by many observers.²⁰ The principal reasons normally cited are that there is much more diversity, and the distances are much greater, in East Asia than in Europe. Levels of economic development, methods of political and social organization, and religious and cultural traditions vary dramatically within the vast area which stretches from New Zealand to North Korea and Western Samoa to Burma. Moreover, East Asia lacks an underlying security structure in any way similar to NATO and the Warsaw Pact, which provided the basic organization for security in Europe when CSCE was established. CSCE ratified a consensus in Europe, acquiesced in by the United States, that World War II political settlements—and thus all existing territorial boundaries—were legitimate and would not be contested by either cold war coalition. Today, it may be argued that CSCE even reflects an ideological consensus, at least at the symbolic level, on the legitimacy of democracy and human rights.²¹ On the other hand, East Asia has too many disputed claims, some involving powerful states like China and Japan, for a consensus to form around any version of a regional territorial status quo. And an ideological consensus, even a very superficial one, would not

extend beyond the virtue of the basic features of the contemporary international trading system. Indeed, given the ethnic and national disputes which have emerged since the collapse of Eastern European Communist regimes and the Soviet Union—which are clearly potentially more destabilizing than those anticipated for EAP—it is doubtful that today a conference on security and cooperation could any longer be established in Europe, either.

A multimember defense alliance like NATO for EAP was often espoused during the cold war, but always rejected due to widely varying threat perceptions among the United States and its allies. The remarkably unsuccessful Southeast Asia Treaty Organization did not set a good precedent. Now there is even less agreement about the existence of threats, and the formation of a collective defense alliance has very limited, if any, support.

Layers in the Regional Security Web.

The undesirability, if not impossibility, of establishing comprehensive security organizations for EAP does not mean that the United States must forgo strategies and policies which foster stability, orderly change, and influence in the region simultaneously, however. If comprehensive organizations and systems of organizations are not yet available, as in Europe, existing limited relationships and multinational agencies now form a rudimentary network which in the future may approximate, in function if not architecture, the institutional infrastructure of Europe. This proposal—that the United States recognize and exploit this array of security-relevant regional structures in its security policy for EAP—is similar to the “building-blocks” approach to security in the region that Professor Desmond Ball of Australian National University advocates for Australia to adopt.²² Building blocks may not be the most appropriate analogy, however, because they imply equal units which, when placed together in rows and columns, form a coherent edifice. On the other hand, existing and proposed security structures in EAP will take many forms, shapes, and sizes, and may better be conceptualized as an irregular, messy web of several layers,²³ with overlapping

structures in many places and probably incomplete segments in others.

From the perspective of the United States, the basis for regional security policy should still be, as it has been for decades, the bilateral relationships between the United States and other nations in the region. These include not only the formal mutual security alliances with Japan, R.O.K., Philippines, Thailand, and Australia,²⁴ but also the less formal security relationships which reach to most of the states—virtually all of the non-Communist states except Burma—of the region. During the cold war they provided an extremely effective way for the United States to optimally mobilize the very diverse nations of the region to advance U.S. security objectives, specifically the containment of the Soviet Union. While exclusive "bilateralism" implies greater U.S. participation and control than the new security environment requires or prevalent domestic attitudes would support, existing bilateral relationships are still mutually beneficial and provide the United States with the ability to influence regional events. Moreover, to precipitously eliminate or undermine these ties would be very destabilizing, and clearly not support U.S. regional objectives. The analogy of EAP's security structure as a fan, "with its base in North America and radiating west across the Pacific," as it has been portrayed by former Secretary of State James Baker,²⁵ is compatible with the concept being presented here. The challenge for the United States is to maintain these relationships, even if they require some adjustments to conform with the new security environment (e.g., the Mutual Security Treaty with the Philippines no longer encompasses forward stationed forces and the informal relationship with Malaysia incorporates expanded security cooperation) without the appearance of U.S. dominance or hegemony, even as the resources available for security in EAP are declining. Over time, as other portions of the security web mature and expand, the United States could and should gradually shift some of its emphasis from bilateralism to other segments of the evolving web. The long-term U.S. goal for the region, according to this proposal, probably not achievable in the foreseeable future, would place the major burden for stability in the EAP on the structures of

the security web which are suggested in the following pages, although the pattern of bilateral arrangements probably would never be completely displaced.

Another set of limited membership relationships are interlaced among U.S. bilateral ties, and also form a part of the security web. The longest existing and most highly developed of these is the Five Power Defence Agreement (FPDA)²⁶ among Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and United Kingdom. A military arrangement established in 1961 when the Federation of Malaya attained independence from Britain and mobilized to assist Malaysia during its *confrontasi* with Indonesia, it now functions to authorize the Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) and otherwise to involve Australia and New Zealand in the maintenance of stability in Southeast Asia. FPDA also provides a structure for the mediation of the sometimes conflicting objectives of Malaysia and Singapore. Australia has established its own network of bilateral security cooperation relationships with the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),²⁷ Papua New Guinea, and a number of the small island states of the South Pacific Forum, which includes security cooperation activities ranging from visits and educational exchanges to combined exercises.²⁸ The six members of ASEAN also have bilateral or trilateral security agreements with each other,²⁹ and their military leaderships have developed close, informal ties—golfing ties, according to many ASEAN wags.

There is no comparable pattern of intra-subregional security cooperation in Northeast Asia, although Japan and the R.O.K. have initiated a limited bilateral relationship, now openly discussed by R.O.K. military officials, despite the popular enmity among Koreans for Japan.³⁰ On the Korean peninsula, Seoul and Pyongyang have negotiated a series of confidence-building measures (CBMs) whose utility have as yet not been fully tested. There have also been unilateral CBMs offered by the R.O.K.-U.S. Combined Forces Command and rejected by the D.P.R.K.³¹

There are also a few bilateral relationships across subregional lines. Australia maintains modest bilateral security relationships with R.O.K. and Japan. Trans-subregional

security relationships at a very limited level, too limited to really call security cooperation, are also achieved through high-level exchanges between Japan and several Southeast Asian nations. Additionally, the United Nations Command in Korea involves the participation of the R.O.K., Australia, Thailand, and Philippines, as well as the United States.

There is a potential for many more restricted security relationships in East Asia, some of which are suggested by Professor Ball in his recent study.³² Like the Maritime Surveillance and Safety Regime proposed by the Institute of Strategic and International Studies of Kuala Lumpur, they should be tailored to satisfy specific needs and involve states which are directly concerned—and thereby be likely to achieve sustained support. They could include the United States, but as in the examples listed by Ball, probably would not. In Northeast Asia, CBM arrangements relating to incidents at sea and openness are among the possible bilateral or multilateral security arrangements which might be developed, and might involve the United States and Russia as well as Northeast Asian states. A variety of arms control regimes have been proposed for the Korean peninsula, at least one of which would create a nuclear free zone incorporating, in addition to the Korean peninsula, Japan and parts of China and Russia.³³ At the least, additional CBMs involving both Koreas and the United States should be forthcoming if rapprochement on the peninsula is realized.

These first layers of the EAP security web can serve to support the implementation of several strategic concepts valuable in achieving U.S. security objectives. The formal bilateral alliances between states in the region and the United States provide the legal basis for collective defense and deterrence against traditional threats to security which may or may not be threatened in the region in the foreseeable future. Together with more informal bilateral security ties, they may facilitate the formation of ad hoc coalitions for enforcing decisions of the U.N. Security Council or for otherwise dealing with crises in the region. These allies and friends have already attained a fair degree of interoperability of doctrine and equipment with the United States and each other. And,

perhaps most basic of all, they provide the framework for U.S. military presence and military presence operations³⁴ throughout the region.

The network of bilateral security ties which involve friends and allies of the United States, and not the United States itself, may reinforce stability by enhancing the combined capabilities of the parties involved, and by increasing openness. Personnel, educational, and intelligence exchanges and combined exercises are probably as important as CBMs as they are as devices for improving the military capability of the participants. This is doubly so in a region where most states are modernizing and enlarging their military establishments.³⁵ Moreover, as indigenous relationships, they can more properly become instruments for necessary adjustments to the status quo than bilateral relationships involving an extra-regional major power.

Subregional Agencies Which Enhance Security.

The next layer of the regional web consists of subregional organizations and agencies with multidimensional jurisdictions which formally are not engaged directly in traditional security tasks, but which are, or can become, fora for discussing a wide range of security issues. East Asia now contains two of these, ASEAN and the South Pacific Forum (SPF), both of which are generally recognized as successful examples of regional organizations.³⁶ In fact, ASEAN is not only cited as a regional structure with direct impacts on security which could be a prototype for other regions, but, as will be discussed below, also the nucleus for an East Asia-wide security forum. The South Pacific Forum, composed, in addition to Australia and New Zealand, of 13 of the world's smallest states³⁷ and located apart from the main corridors of intercourse in the Pacific, has had limited influence beyond the territory of its members. There is no comparable organization in Northeast Asia.

Neither ASEAN nor the SPF was created to perform security tasks or serve as a security forum. But governments which regularly meet to consider common economic and social concerns also inevitably deal with political issues, outside of

the formal structure of their organization if not within it. In fact, ASEAN's outstanding success, mobilizing international support to denounce Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia and restoring a non-Communist government in Phnom Penh, clearly belongs to the "unauthorized" political and security spheres. SPF created a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone,³⁸ and its smaller members regularly use the organization to confront outside powers such as France, Japan, and the United States.³⁹ Subregional security fora need not necessarily evolve from organizations formally committed to nonpolitical activities in order to be enmeshed in the EAP security web. However, the evolution of ASEAN and the SPF does illustrate an important premise of this report's concept of regional security: subregional and regional structures which have emerged to satisfy the pressing needs of their members, not necessarily those formal organizations based on abstract principles, are likely to make the greater contributions to regional stability. Organizations such as these have survived—even thrived—partly because they have been flexible enough to allow their members to adapt to a changing security environment.

In addition to being fora for the consideration of security issues, both organizations also have become what Karl Deutsch has called "security communities"⁴⁰—groups of nations which have stable expectations of peace in their relations with each other and which are sensitive to each other's needs and interests. The 6 members of ASEAN and the 15 members of SPF have developed the procedures and practices to adjust disputes, respond to each other's needs, and cooperate in mutually beneficial activities. In other words, they have achieved a very high level of stability—provided ways to achieve change without resort to force—as far as their inter-organizational relations are concerned. Moreover, neither organization has threatened, nor developed the capability to threaten, military action against other regional groupings or, for that matter, single states outside of their communities. Since the existence of security communities provide islands of stability within EAP, their formation and expansion obviously support U.S. regional security objectives.

The incorporation of new members into a security community could undermine its cohesion if the elites of the new members do not share the attitudes and values that gave the organization the qualities of a security community in the first place, however. Thus, the addition of newly independent South Pacific island nations to the SPF probably would not affect its character as a security community because the remaining dependent countries in the South Pacific share many of their cultural characteristics and economic and political problems with the members of the SPF. On the other hand, expanding ASEAN at the present time to include the states of Indochina, frequently discussed as a measure required to provide stability for Southeast Asia,⁴¹ might transform the character of the organization. In addition to ideological differences (which may fade with the passage of time, but still have resonance among both Indochinese and ASEAN elites), there is a heritage of conflict and national enmity between Thailand and all countries of Indochina, and among the Indochina states themselves. While these historic animosities might be overcome partly because of membership in a regional organization, as German and French membership in the European Community has aided in the evolution of amicable relations between two historic enemies, the addition of Indochinese states into ASEAN might also introduce these historic tensions into the organization. If so, the expectations of peaceful relations and sensitivity to each other's needs which define a security community would be dangerously weakened. On the other hand, an enlarged ASEAN, even if it ceased to be a security community, might be a better forum for the discussion of security issues precisely because it would include possible adversaries. From the U.S. perspective, it might be better for a security community among the six current members of ASEAN to continue to exist, alongside of a structure which provided for regular, frequent security consultations involving all of the states of Southeast Asia.

While there is nothing comparable to ASEAN or SPF in Northeast Asia, former R.O.K. President Roh Tae Woo has proposed regular consultation among the two Koreas, Japan, China, Russia, and the United States for the purposes of resolving disputes between North and South Korea and

preserving security in the region, as have a number of unofficial observers.⁴² No such forum has been established. One of the reasons behind the Northeast Asia nuclear free zone referred to in the discussion of the second layer of the security web was to establish a subregional structure which might evolve into a forum for regional security consultation.

Regional Dialogue: ASEAN-PMC and APEC.

The next level in the regional security web involves structures to consider broad region-wide security issues, as distinguished from the more restricted geographically, and usually functionally, structures of the first two layers of the proposed security web. Since most observers and decision makers in the region, as well as U.S. policymakers, believe that the time has not yet (or never will) come for a truly comprehensive security organization in EAP, these agencies necessarily only deal with a limited number of states and/or only include a limited range of security issues which affect the region. The two existing structures in the region which have or might become forums for EAP-wide security consultations have both limited membership and limited substantive jurisdictions.

The Post Ministerial Conference of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, often referred to as ASEAN-PMC, or simply PMC, now explicitly deals with regional security issues.⁴³ ASEAN invites certain "dialogue partners" to meet with ASEAN foreign ministers at the end of its Annual Ministerial Meeting (AMM), with the expressed purpose of discussing diplomatic and political issues which are important to the hosts—and apparently also to the guests, who are always anxious to attend. Although the Annual Economic Ministers Meeting of ASEAN, a separate forum, has primary jurisdiction over international economic issues, such questions also get raised in the PMC. Security issues were always discussed at the PMC meetings—the boundaries between regional diplomatic, economic, and security concerns have always been hazy, and the ASEAN campaign against Vietnam was its major initiative during most of the existence of the PMC—but they were never formally on the agenda until 1992,

and they probably rarely extended beyond Southeast Asia. However, accepting recommendations of ASEAN Institutes of International and Strategic Studies,⁴⁴ ASEAN foreign ministers concluded in 1991 that the changes in the regional security environment, particularly the closure of U.S. bases in the Philippines, made explicit EAP-wide security consultations highly desirable. They proposed that the PMC become the forum for that dialogue, and dialogue partners concurred. In the first "security" PMC in 1992, Southeast Asia issues appeared to dominate the discussions (press reports centered on the Spratly Islands),⁴⁵ but Northeast Asia issues were also on the agenda.

PMC is certainly not a perfect vehicle for EAP security consultations. There are seven dialogue partners: Australia, Canada, European Community, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, and the United States. ASEAN has not chosen to invite China, Vietnam, or Russia, three regional actors as important to regional security discussions as most of the dialogue partners and most of the members of ASEAN, to attend the PMC. China and Russia were invited guests to the AMM in 1991⁴⁶ and 1992, and Vietnam and Laos (together with Papua New Guinea) are official observers at the AMM, both statuses giving their foreign ministers the opportunity to be at the conference site and informally interact with the foreign ministers of the dialogue partners, but not actually participate in any of the PMC (or even AMM) formal sessions.⁴⁷

Moreover, the six members of ASEAN control not only who may participate, but also the agenda. While it is possible that ASEAN PMC could evolve into a significant forum—a "G13" which could make its mark not only on regional, but even global,⁴⁸ developments—it has not yet done so and cannot become *the* important regional security forum as presently organized. The absence of China, Russia, and Vietnam presents obvious obstacles. Nonetheless, as an established agency with strategically placed proponents (for various reasons, all of the dialogue partners and AMM guests and observers covet association with ASEAN), ASEAN provides a useful, even if imperfect, forum for security discussions and consultations. Moreover, the governments which do

participate have similar security objectives, most notably regional stability, at the present time. As long as the compatibility of U.S. and ASEAN policy persists, the PMC should have utility for the United States. ASEAN also has a permanent headquarters and a secretary general with recently enhanced powers who could serve as an executive agent for the PMC if one were ever required, which is highly unlikely unless the PMC evolves into a much more active agency.

The Asia Pacific Economic Conference (APEC) has the potential to become a forum for political and security consultations. It has been enthusiastically endorsed by the United States, Japan, and virtually all other members as an organization to foster increased trade and liberalization, the former boasting more advocates than the latter, and is thus widely valued. Its geographical jurisdiction is the entire Pacific Rim, which includes EAP and more. But its membership of 15 is only slightly greater than the ASEAN-PMC. In fact, 12 of the 13 ASEAN-PMC participants (the exception is the EC) are also APEC members. The three APEC members who are not a part of ASEAN-PMC are China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. China particularly is obviously an extremely important participant for discussions on security, possibly making APEC more representative of the region's security dimension than PMC. However, Vietnam and Russia are not members; nor is India, outside of EAP but obviously an influence on regional security. Russia and India, plus eight other nations, have applied for membership. But expanding APEC to include 10 applicants,⁴⁹ 5 of them from Latin America, would leave the organization extremely unwieldy, and challenge its coherence as a regional forum for its basic role of economic consultation, not to mention security discussions. Accepting only Russia and India to enhance the organization for security discussion is unlikely because several Asian members are anxious to include Mexico,⁵⁰ the projected North American Free Trade Association party presently outside of APEC, in order to enhance the quality of the organization for economic consultations. And selecting Mexico for membership while rejecting the other four Latin American applicants, even though their economic and security interests in EAP are limited, would pose obvious diplomatic problems and will not likely be

attempted soon. However, although only slightly larger than PMC, APEC with its present membership does have the advantage that all of the members formally enjoy equal status within the organization, and the agenda for its annual meetings is created in accordance with the normal diplomatic practice of consensus and comity rather than determined by a single set of members. In terms of international economics, they share a broad consensus which permits wide-ranging consultations. Particularly because of the inclusion of China, an equally firm consensus on security probably would be lacking, and discussion of many security issues might prove difficult. Such a forum could be valuable for the transfer of information on controversial questions, however. The security aspects of EAP economic questions almost inevitably will be a part of APEC debates, however, and they will not involve trivial matters. Professor Ball lists the following issues, among others: dependence of Asia Pacific economics on overseas trade and the vulnerability of SLOCs, the relationship between defense expenditures and economic growth and technological development, environmental issues such as transportation and disposal of hazardous materials, regional rationalization of defense industrial infrastructures for production and maintenance of defense equipment, and the increasing problems of piracy against commercial shipping in the Malacca and Singapore Straits.⁵¹ In fact, there have been several proposals, the most prominent by former Thai Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun when he opened the 1992 Annual Meeting of APEC in Bangkok,⁵² for APEC to increase its jurisdiction to explicitly include security issues, whether they have direct economic implications or are derived from economic issues or not. On the other hand, explicitly changing the charter of APEC has a number of opponents, China, India, and the United States among them.⁵³ The Thai proposal was not acted on or widely discussed. As one of the major economic powers in the region with a substantial interest in regional stability, the United States should support APEC as a center for the discussion of the security implications of economic issues, as well as the economic questions themselves. Using APEC as a forum for routine consideration of political and security issues, in addition to the economic

questions it was originally created to consider, may have at best limited benefits, since ASEAN-PMC and regular diplomatic channels provide a similar forum. It would have the disadvantage of denigrating the salience of trade, investment, and economic assistance issues, and shift responsibility for participation in APEC from the members' international trade and finance ministries to their foreign ministries, neither of which many governments in the region desire. But in cases where the United States wanted broad consultation on security issues which ASEAN states preferred to avoid—unlikely to occur in the near term—and therefore could not be placed on the agenda of the PMC, APEC might be resorted to as an alternate to ASEAN-PMC.

Neither ASEAN-PMC nor APEC is likely to evolve in the near or mid-term into collective defense organizations or security communities. But as formalized structures for consultation, they can be useful to the United States in managing regional security policy. Moreover, they provide the framework for an expanding regime of confidence-building measures (they are themselves CBMs) to increase transparency and reduce errors in the relations of states in EAP. That alone will not necessarily bring about greater regional stability and security, but it should have the effect of reducing the number of issues which have the potential to become causes of disputes and minimizing arms races based on reciprocal misperceptions of each other's intentions. As the patterns of interaction among the states of EAP expand and become more complex, the factors which now prevent the formation of more comprehensive structures to deal with security issues may recede in significance compared to the benefits that can be gained from closer collaboration. As this happens, if it does, one or both of these two existing structures may be gradually transformed into a region-wide organization which ultimately will provide the framework for maintaining stability and economic growth and facilitating peaceful change for East Asia and Pacific. Such an evolution would probably be more successful than the radical change in patterns which might be associated with the creation of an entirely new comprehensive organization. However, even the creation of a region-wide forum for consultation on political and security

issues—one which would include the influential powers which now are excluded in existing organizations—should not necessarily be excluded by the United States, if it supplemented and did not displace the other security structures in the region. A consultation only forum would not be an Asian clone of CSCE, which has an elaborate infrastructure and system of agreements and would face the problems discussed earlier in this report. Moreover, the development of a regional security forum has increasing support within EAP,⁵⁴ and may be established with or without U.S. support.

In addition to these well-established organizations, which normally meet infrequently, there could and probably will be numerous ad hoc, single purpose conferences to consider EAP security or particular EAP security issues. Some, such as the Indonesian sponsored conferences on the Spratly Islands, which were attended by unofficial as well as official delegates, may not be designed to arrive at formal decisions or bind governments to specific positions. Others could result in international agreements. The United States should selectively support, and selectively participate in, such conferences.

Global Structures Affecting Regional Security.

The last layer of structures in the imperfect web of security agencies are those global organizations which significantly influence security in EAP, whether or not many states in the region participate in them. They include, first of all, the principal organs of the United Nations overtly involved in political and security affairs: the Security Council, the General Assembly, and the Secretariat. The most important of these, the Security Council, probably will have only one member from the region (unless the U.N. Charter is amended to designate Japan as an additional permanent member)⁵⁵ even when it deals with EAP issues. Of course, the United States will always be a member. The Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, which reports to the U.N. Economic and Social Council and whose membership extends beyond EAP, and the U.N. Development Program, an agency of the General Assembly,

initiate and support programs (e.g., the Mekong River Development⁵⁶ and the Tumen River Development plans⁵⁷) with potentially significant security implications. The layer also involves those ad hoc agencies, like the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), established to deal directly with EAP crises or problems. In addition, it includes the many other U.N. family organizations whose activities sometimes, but not always, have security implications. The work of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, for instance, may relieve or complicate the security equations of regional states, as it now does for Burma, Thailand, and Malaysia. Decisions of the "nonpolitical" U.N. specialized agencies, like the International Labor Organization; World Health Organization; United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; and others potentially can have political and security implications, although their security impacts normally are not too significant.

The top layer also consists of non-U.N. structures which are global in scope. EAP is well represented in some of them, such as the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT), the Group of 77, and the Non-aligned Movement. Others, like the Group of Seven Industrial Nations (G7), may have a greater impact on the economic and political developments in EAP than the former (except for GATT), but will only have direct participation by Japan, and, of course, the major nonregional power with very critical interests in EAP, the United States. The decisions of these structures may have significant implications—security as well as economic and political—for all EAP nations. U.S. regional security objectives, as well as the more directly relevant global economic issues, should inform U.S. actions in these fora.

Conclusions.

The policy modifications advocated in the preceding pages call for explicitly defining the U.S. regional objective of preserving stability so that U.S. policy is not automatically identified with the status quo, and for increasingly relying on the multimember structures of the regional security web to achieve security objectives. This multi-layered, somewhat chaotic web—and it is actually more varied and complex than

this description indicates⁵⁸—is the framework within which, or against which, U.S. policy must operate in EAP. The structures of the web should not be resisted in rhetoric or operations as a matter of policy, even if they will not always be appropriate instruments for the execution of U.S. policy. In other words, when possible the United States should work within and not against them. In fact, the United States seems to do so now as far as ASEAN, APEC, and the SPF are concerned, even if it does not explicitly accept the approach.

The emphasis of this report has been on stability, a U.S. regional security objective of paramount importance. Regional stability is arguably a necessary condition for achieving other U.S. regional security objectives, such as promoting democracy, human rights, and the conditions required for profitable economic activities, as well as unimpeded access to regional LOCs. The United States is likely to have better access to EAP governments in a stable environment—especially if most regional leaders perceive that the United States is the assurer of stability—and its objectives of protecting U.S. territory and citizens will also presumably be less threatened with stability than without it.

In a more specific sense, the execution of U.S. policy within the context of the security web, as imperfect as it is, promotes regional security by enmeshing China and Japan in an array of organizations which can constrain their behavior, and affect the perceptions of leaders of the region about the intentions of China and Japan. In Northeast Asia, this is especially true with respect to Japan, which is widely feared as a potential security threat.⁵⁹ In Southeast Asia, leaders and observers are also concerned about possible roles of Japan, but probably less urgently than they fear possible future actions by China, the closer major regional power and the state with territorial disputes and/or historic antipathies with most Southeast Asian nations. China's current, and expected to be continuing, emphasis on military modernization after a decade of very low military budgets exacerbates those fears.⁶⁰

That is not to say that the United States should never take unilateral action or oppose positions articulated by some of the organizations operating in EAP. Both will at times undoubtedly

be appropriate. And the long-standing bilateral relationships between the United States and many EAP nations may continue to be the best framework for certain aspects of U.S. regional policy. They are the foundation for U.S. forward presence operations. Indeed, the keys to mollifying the perception of EAP leaders about future roles of Japan, in addition to constraining Japan through the security web, are that the United States and Japan maintain the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty and a viable bilateral security relationship, and that the United States deploy a credible military presence in the region.⁶¹ Even though the security web constrains China, America's military presence will also continue to be necessary in preserving stability in Southeast Asia in the context of Chinese behavior and perceptions of Chinese intentions.⁶² But undoubtedly the twin imperatives of reducing expenditures and fostering stability which respects orderly change can best be achieved through an increasing emphasis on multilateral institutions in which the United States shares, or perhaps only observes, activities which support stability. Logically, the United States should also encourage the development of some of these organizations through diplomatic, economic, and operational support, to maintain U.S. influence in the various elements of the security web and to assist in forging more effective regional institutions.

For the foreseeable future, there will be a high degree of uncertainty in the security environment of EAP, with the possibility that dissatisfied, aggressive governments will attempt to achieve their goals by the use of force, and thereby undermine stability and the interests of the United States and many regional states in the process. None of the existing multi-member organizations, including ASEAN, FPDA, SPF, or APEC, is likely to be equipped to initiate and sustain a military coalition against an aggressive regional state. With the exception of the Five Power Defense Agreement, they are not collective defense organizations. If such an unwanted occasion arises in EAP, the United States will be the only nation with the prestige and capability to forge an ad hoc coalition to resist and punish the aggression. It is extremely important that the United States sustain the capability to carry out such responsibilities; it cannot assure regional states a

stable environment without it. However, the more mature and comprehensive the organizations of the security web, the more costly the resort to destabilizing operations should become for all states in the region, and the less likely that the United States should be required to lead international peace-enforcing operations in Asia and the Pacific.

ENDNOTES

1. References to the Asia-Pacific region often vary, both in the terminology used and the area referred to. This paper focuses on East Asia and the Pacific, the nomenclature of the U.S. Department of State, and the anagram "EAP." The latter is unfamiliar to most readers, but extremely convenient. EAP consists of Northeast Asia (North and South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and China), Southeast Asia (Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam), and the South Pacific (Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, and 12 small island nations).

2. See Thomas L. Wilborn, *How Northeast Asians View Their Security*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1991; and almost all reporting on security matters in *The New York Times* and other national newspapers.

3. For example, see "A New Korea Policy for a Changed World," *Korea Journal of Defense Analysis*, Vol. IV, No. 2, Winter 1992, pp. 259-277, and other works by Douglas Bandow; and Richard J. Ellings and Edward A. Olsen, "Asia's Challenge to American Strategy," *NBR Analysis*, Vol. 3, No. 2, June 1992.

4. Wilborn, *How Northeast Asians View Their Security*, and discussions by the author with respondents in the region. The concerns about U.S. withdrawal are frequently reflected in press interviews and statements of political leaders and officials.

5. The following analysis has benefitted from the excellent work of Muthiah Alagappa, "Regional Arrangements and International Security in Southeast Asia: Going Beyond ZOPFAN," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 12, No. 4, March 1991, pp. 269-305; and Patrick M. Cronin, "Does Multilateralism Have a Future in Asia?", paper prepared for the 1992 Pacific Symposium, February 27-28, 1992; "Pacific Rim Security: Beyond Bilateralism?", *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1992, pp. 209-220.

6. *A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Report to Congress 1992*, a report required by Congress in the FY92-93 Defense Authorization Act, p. 9, lists eight enduring U.S. security interests (protecting the United States and its allies from attack; maintaining regional

peace and stability; preserving our political and economic access; contributing to nuclear deterrence; fostering the growth of democracy and human rights; stopping proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and ballistic missile systems; ensuring freedom of navigation; and reducing illicit drug trafficking) and four fundamental security missions for U.S. armed forces (defending Alaska, Hawaii, and the connecting lines of communication [LOCs] to the continental United States; protecting U.S. territories and Freely Associated States for which the United States has defense responsibilities; assisting our allies in defense; and maintaining the security of the LOCs throughout the Pacific as well as the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean, and East and South China Seas [the report deals with the jurisdiction of the Pacific Command, which is broader than EAP]) in EAP. Except for the interest in reducing drug trafficking, an issue not dealt with in this study, they are all stated or implied in the discussion in this report of U.S. security objectives in the region.

7. Admiral Charles R. Larson, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, "Uncertainties, Turbulence Head Concerns," *Defense* 1992, July/August, pp. 31-41. "Now, however, there is a change as our national survival is less threatened, and we can devote greater attention and resources to secure our economic growth, regional stability and vigorous alliances."

8. On the reformulation of traditional strategic concepts for the post-cold war era, see Thomas L. Wilborn, *Roles for the Army in a Peacetime Engagement Strategy in the Pacific*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992, pp. 12-24.

9. See Wilborn, *How Northeast Asians View Their Security*, pp. 50-52.

10. That the leaders of ASEAN urged the Philippines to retain U.S. bases is perhaps the best evidence of the change in attitudes. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore have entered into access and repair agreements with the United States since the withdrawal took place.

11. For details on military spending in the region, see Andrew Mack and Desmond Ball, "The Military Build-up in Asia-Pacific," *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1992, pp. 197-207.

12. For instance, Larson, p. 41, and James Baker, "America in Asia: Emerging Architecture," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 70, No. 5, Winter 1991/92, p. 5.

13. Most U.S. observers assume that Pyongyang spends 20-25 percent of its GDP for military purposes, which is the CIA estimate. *The World Handbook*, 1991, p. 171. Since North Korea no longer has a source of modern weapons and equipment at concessionary prices and terms, as the Soviet Union and China once provided, the burden of sustaining its military organization should be much greater in the future.

14. The unprecedented Prime Ministers' meetings are significant primarily in that they have kept a dialogue open. There have been significant agreements on principles, however, and a protocol establishing liaison offices at Panmunjom. The latter represent the first official channels of communication between the two parts of the country since 1945.

15. In accordance with plans announced in April 1990, the United States had eliminated 5,000 Army and 2,000 Air Force positions in Korea by the beginning of 1993. Any further reduction in U.S. forces has been suspended until Pyongyang agrees to mutual inspection of nuclear facilities which meets the minimum requirements of Seoul and Washington.

16. U.S. and North Korean diplomats stationed in Beijing have met intermittently for a number of years. The only meeting involving high-level personnel took place on January 14, 1992, between Arnold Kanter, U.S. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, and Kim Yong Nam, Director of International Relations for the Korean Workers' Party. The opportunity for communications also exists through the two countries' U.N. delegations.

17. However, during the cold war, stability often meant a predictable relationship with the Soviet Union, or, more narrowly, the balance and configuration of military forces within a battlefield. See Schuyler Foester, William A. Barry III, William R. Clontz, and Harold F. Lynch, Jr., *Defining Stability: Conventional Arms Control in a Changing Europe*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989.

18. In this report, security is used in its more traditional, and relatively narrow, meaning which focuses on the issues most likely to involve military considerations. Nonetheless, the author understands that economic, environmental, and political issues are so interrelated that they cannot be isolated from each other, and alludes to that phenomenon in the succeeding pages.

19. Brezhnev's proposal was a thinly veiled attempt to isolate China. Senator Gareth Evans, the Australian Foreign Minister, envisioned a comprehensive organization for post-cold war Asia. "What Asia Needs is a Europe-Style CSCA," *International Herald Tribune*, July 27, 1990, p. 6.

20. General John Galvin, former SACEUR, is among other advocates of a CSCE type organization for Asia. "America's Asian Challenge," *U.S. News and World Report*, October 19, 1992, p. 50. Desmond Ball, *Building Blocks for Regional Security: An Australian Perspective on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) in the Asia/Pacific Region*, Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 1991, pp. 26-27.

21. K.J. Holsti, during discussions at "Discord and Collaboration in a New Europe: An International Conference to Address the Prospects for

Peace in Post Cold War Europe," Dickinson College, Carlisle, PA, October 30, 1992.

22. See Ball, *Building Blocks for Regional Security*.

23. The notion of a regional security system of layers of structures was suggested by Alagappa, p. 203.

24. Technically, the basis of the U.S. security relationships with Thailand and Australia are not based on bilateral treaties. In a legal sense, U.S.-Thai relations grow out of the Manila Pact, a multilateral treaty; the Rusk-Thanat agreement provides that security obligations between the United States and Thailand are bilateral. ANZUS, a triangular agreement among Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, governs U.S.-Australia security relations, but the participation of New Zealand has been suspended since it denied entry of nuclear weapons and nuclear powered ships to its ports in 1985.

25. Baker, p. 4.

26. On FPDA, see Ball, pp. 41-47, and Sheldon Simon, "The Regionalization of Defense in Southeast Asia," *NBR Analysis*, Vol. 3, No. 1, June 1992, pp. 15-16.

27. Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.

28. Ball, pp. 41, 49.

29. Simon, pp. 11-15.

30. Yong-ku Cha, "Military Academician on Future Ties With Japan," Tokyo *Mainichi Shimbun*, November 27, 1991, Morning Edition, p. 4, in Daily Report, East Asia, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service* (hereinafter *FBIS-EAS*), Annex, December 4, 1991, pp. 14-15; and "Military to Increase Exchanges With Japan," *Yonhap* (Seoul), October 21, 1992, reported in *FBIS-EAS-92-204*, pp. 18-19.

31. Combined Forces Command exercises are announced in advance, and the D.P.R.K., as well as other nations, are invited to send observers.

32. Ball, pp. 30-87.

33. The proposal was conceived by Professor John Endicott, and presented to a panel of regional specialists, including the author, at the Institute for Defense Analysis in Alexandria, Virginia, on February 25, 1992. It is discussed by Cronin, "Does Multilateralism Have a Future in Asia?" p. 13; and "Pacific Rim Security: Beyond Bilateralism?", p. 215.

34. "Military presence operations" is the current terminology for what previously was called "peacetime engagement." It involves a variety of cooperative military activities, ranging from combined exercises through the deployment of training teams to humanitarian and rescue operations. For a discussion of these programs in the U.S. Pacific Command, see Wilborn, *Roles for the Army in a Peacetime Engagement Strategy in the Pacific*.

35. On the expansion of military capabilities in the region, see Andrew Mack and Desmond Ball, pp. 197-208; Gerald Segal, "Managing Asia/Pacific Arms Races," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 15, No. 3, Summer 1992, pp. 83-100; and Andrew Mack, "More Arms, Less Stability: Nuclear, Chemical and Missile Proliferation in the Asia-Pacific," paper prepared for a Defense Academic Research Program and U.S. Pacific Command sponsored conference on Changing East-West Relations: Implications for East and Southeast Asia, April 1991.

36. The success of these organizations has led some analysts to perceive a uniquely valuable style of cooperation in this region. See Michael Haas, *The Asian Way to Peace: A Story of Regional Cooperation and The Pacific Way: Regional Cooperation in the South Pacific*, New York: Praeger, 1989; and Norman D. Palmer, *The New Regionalism in Asia and the Pacific*, Lexington Books, Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1991. Palmer puts less stress on regional cultural factors than Haas.

37. The South Pacific Forum consists of Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Western Samoa. Four of these are internally self-governing but not fully sovereign: Cook Islands and Niue are in free association with New Zealand, and Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia are in free association with the United States. The latter two are U.N. members.

38. An Australian proposal designed to preempt more radical schemes, the treaty was produced at the 1985 SPF summit. Among nuclear powers, only China and the Soviet Union ratified, the latter with reservations.

39. The most urgent security issue of SPF members may relate to the environment. The "greenhouse effect" could cause the Pacific Ocean to rise enough to completely submerge some of them. *Asia Yearbook 1989*, Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review, 1989, p. 61.

40. See Karl W. Deutsch, *Political Community at the International Level: Problems of Definition and Measurement*, Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1954, pp. 33-43. According to Deutsch, a security community exists when there are stable expectations of peace among the participating units or groups, p. 33. One category of security

community, the community of mutual responsiveness, closely corresponds to the circumstances of ASEAN's development:

While political units in this category might be able to do much without each other's aid and might have no need to tremble at one another's threats, they might have acquired the political habits, practices, and institutions necessary to perceive one another's sensitive spots or 'vital interests,' and to make prompt and adequate responses to each other's critical needs.

On ASEAN as a security community, see Amitav Acharya, "The Association of Southeast Asian Nations: 'Security Community' or 'Defence Community?'" *Pacific Affairs*, Vol 64, No. 2, Summer 1991, pp. 159-178.

41. ASEAN has not officially offered or discussed membership with Indochinese nations, nor have the latter applied for membership. Laos and Vietnam have acceded to the ASEAN sponsored Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia in response to ASEAN's invitation to all Southeast Asian countries, and have observer status at the Annual Ministerial Meetings. See the "Singapore Declaration of 1992," press release of the ASEAN Heads of Government Meeting, Singapore, January 28, 1992.

42. Roh's proposal was made to the U.N. General Assembly in 1992. "Envoy to U.S. on Proposed Security Conference," *Yonhap*, September 29, 1992, reported in *FBIS-EAS-92-189*, September 29, 1992, p. 17. For examples of other proposals, see the comments of Robert O'Neill at the 34th Annual Conference of the International Institute of Strategic Studies, Seoul, September 9-12, 1992, as summarized in the Concluding Remarks by Francois Heisbourg, p. 25; and Stephen Kirby, "New World Order: A Flawed Strategy for Northeast Asia," *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, Vol. III, No. 2, Winter 1991, pp. 56-61.

43. "Singapore Declaration of 1992," p. 2.

44. Ball, p. 52, citing ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies, *A Time for Initiative: Proposals for the Consideration of the Fourth ASEAN Summit*, June 4, 1991, pp. 4-5.

45. Robert S. Greenberger, "Spratly Islands Dispute in Southeast Asia Spotlights U.S. Role in Regional Security," *The Wall Street Journal*, July 27, 1992, p. A6.

46. Technically, the 1991 invitation was not from the ASEAN foreign ministers, but from the host, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir.

47. The PMC consists of a six (the members of ASEAN) plus seven (the dialogue partners) conference, and seven six plus one meetings.

Muthiah Alagappa, "ASEAN Institutional Framework and Modus Operandi: Recommendations for Change," in Noordin Sopiee and others, eds., *ASEAN at the Crossroads: Obstacles, Options and Opportunities in Economic Co-operation*, Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), Malaysia, 1987, p. 186.

48. S. Bilveer, "ASEAN and the New Security Framework in the Asia-Pacific Region," *Asian Defence Journal*, December 1991, pp. 17-19.

49. Besides India and Russia, the applicants are Argentina, Ecuador, Chile, Mexico, Mongolia, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, and Peru.

50. "Japan Cautious on Expanding APEC Membership," KYODO, September 8, 1992, reported in *FBIS-EAS-92-175*, September 9, 1992, p. 3.

51. Desmond Ball, "Tasks for Security Cooperation in Asia," paper prepared for the 3d Conference on Security Cooperation in the Asia/Pacific, Seoul, November 1-3, 1992, pp. 15-16.

52. "PM Sees Regional Security Role," *The Nation*, September 11, 1992, p. A4 reported in *FBIS-EAS-92-177*, September 11, 1992, p. 1. A similar proposal made by Prime Minister Keating of Australia was supported initially by Prime Minister Miyazawa of Japan. Eugene Brown, *Japan's Search for Strategic Vision: The Contemporary Debate*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, February 25, 1993.

53. India and China strongly oppose a political or security role for APEC. "PM Sees Regional Security Role," p. 1.

54. For example, see "Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation Plan Considered," *Yonhap* (Seoul), April 30, 1992, reported in *FBIS-EAS-92-084*, April 30, 1992, p. 14; "Miyazawa Urged to Promote Regional Dialogue [Report to Prime Minister by the Council on Japan and the Asian-Pacific Region for the 21st Century]," KYODO, December 25, 1992, reported in *FBIS-EAS-92-250*, December 29, 1992, p. 1; and Michael Vatikiotis, "Helsinki, Asian Style," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 14, 1992, p. 20.

55. Japan actively seeks a permanent seat on the Security Council, as do Germany and potentially a number of other nations, including Indonesia. Adding permanent members to the Security Council requires the approval of two-thirds of U.N. members. See John Bolton, "No Expansion for U.N. Security Council," *The Wall Street Journal*, January 26, 1993, p. A14.

56. The Mekong River Development Project was briefly resumed in 1977 (it was first interrupted by the Second Indochina War), but was halted with the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978. Ronald J. Cima, ed.,

Vietnam: A Country Study, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989, p. 231.

57. Tumen River Development would involve parts of China, Russia, and the DPRK. Sponsored by the U.N. Development Program, it is being eagerly supported by Pyongyang. Early discussions have included, besides the principal parties, Japan and the ROK. See Chae-yong Yi, "All About the Tumen River Development Plan, the Core of a Northeast Asia Economic Sphere," *MAL* (Seoul), December 1991, pp. 78-83, reported in *FBIS-EAS-92-039*, pp. 29-34.

58. Haas identified 22 "Pacific" regional organizations in existence (*The Pacific Way*, Table 1.1, p. 7) and 42 "Asian" regional organizations in existence (*The Asian Way to Peace*, Table 1.1, p. 11.).

59. Wilborn, *How Northeast Asians View Their Security*, p. 64-68.

60. Nicholas D. Kristof, "China Builds Its Military Muscle, Making Some Neighbors Nervous," *The New York Times*, January 11, 1993, p. A1. See also Tai Ming Cheung, "Quick Response: Military Planners Focus on External Threats," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, January 14, 1993, pp. 19-21.

61. Jusuf Wanandi, "Peace and Security in Southeast Asia," *The Indonesian Quarterly*, Vol. XIX, No. 4, Fourth Quarter 1991, p. 321.

62. "Minister Urges U.S. To 'Stay Engaged' in Asia," *The Straits Times*, October 2, 1992, p. 13, reported in *FBIS-EAS-92-193*, October 5, 1992, p. 18.

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